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Sino–Indian Economic Ties since 1988: 
Progress, Problems, and Prospects for 
Future Development 
Jingdong YUAN 
Abstract: This article takes stock of the evolution of bilateral eco-
nomic ties between China and India since the early 1990s. It analyses 
the factors that have contributed to the expansion of this important 
aspect of their relationship, but also highlights the obstacles, in par-
ticular the politico-strategic variables, to further expansion of eco-
nomic ties, including investments. It argues that while both Beijing 
and New Delhi recognise the importance of trade and investment in 
their relationship, future growth in bilateral economic ties depends on 
how the two countries can successfully deal with issues such as trade 
imbalance, market access, infrastructure, and regulatory environment. 
But more importantly, Beijing and New Delhi must seriously address 
each other’s security concerns, including those areas that affect their 
perceptions of economic security and consequently their policies 
towards bilateral and regional cooperation. 
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Introduction 
Since Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi’s historical visit to China in 
1988, bilateral relations have undergone significant changes. While 
territorial disputes, the Tibet issue, and threat perceptions continue to 
cast a shadow over full normalisation of relations between Asia’s two 
ancient civilisations – both rising powers in the region, a relatively 
bright spot in this otherwise complex and tenuous relationship is the 
expansion and, more important, the future prospects of economic 
ties. Indeed, over the past two and a half decades, much progress has 
been made in the area of two-way trade, albeit emerging from a rather 
low starting point. However, in recent years, bilateral trade has stag-
nated and growing frictions over trade imbalance, market access, and 
security considerations have become serious obstacles to the future 
expansion of the economic dimension of bilateral relations. An area 
that could and should benefit both countries has yet to live up to the 
expectations of, or meet the targets set by, the two governments.  
Given the size of the two rapidly growing economies, with a 
combined population of more than 2.5 billion people, much can be 
gained through the expansion of trade and investment. Greater eco-
nomic interaction and interdependence is often believed to have a 
positive impact on interstate relations. However, in the China–India 
case, the economics–security nexus tends to be more complex. While 
much can be gained through expansion of trade and investment, and 
indeed the political leadership at the national and subnational levels 
have in general promoted growth in economic ties, their unresolved 
territorial disputes, India’s concerns over Chinese intentions in South 
Asia, and the long-standing Sino–Pakistani strategic relationship have 
limited the scope and depth of bilateral cooperation. I argue that until 
and unless Beijing and New Delhi can fundamentally address the 
security dimension of their relationship, bilateral economic ties will be 
affected by political as well as economic considerations.  
This article takes stock of the evolution of bilateral economic ties 
between China and India since the early 1990s and analyses the fac-
tors that have contributed to the expansion of this important aspect 
of their relationship but also highlights the obstacles – in particular, 
the politico-strategic variables – to further expansion of economic 
ties, including investments. The article examines Sino–Indian eco-
nomic ties at the bilateral and, to some extent, subregional levels 
(such as the Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar Economic Corridor, 
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or BCIM-EC, formerly known as the Kunming Initiative) and seeks 
to understand the rationale and dynamics behind the progress and 
problems in an effort to assess the future prospects of an important 
aspect of Sino–Indian relations in the coming decades. 
The Economics–Security Nexus and
Sino–Indian Relations 
The past quarter of a century has witnessed significant growth in 
Sino–Indian trade, albeit from a very low starting point. Investment 
flows, though, have remained small compared to both countries’ 
inward and outward FDI volumes. Overall, Sino–Indian economic 
ties have developed even as their political relationship from time to 
time has experienced setbacks and occasional tensions. At the same 
time, economic security considerations have also increasingly factored 
into Sino–Indian trade and investment, especially in recent years, as 
Beijing has aggressively pursued a policy of opening up new markets, 
cornering resources, and expanding economic influence, while New 
Delhi seeks to protect its domestic industry, gain market access for its 
niche sectors, and guard against external intrusion into its sphere of 
influence (Tellis, Tanner and Keough 2011; Chadda 2014). While 
both China and India have benefitted from globalisation since the late 
1970s and early 1990s, respectively, by gradually opening up to the 
outside world, expanding trade, and drawing in investment, as Asia’s 
two rising powers with growing ambitions and unresolved disputes 
they are also conscious of relative gains, dependence and vulnerabil-
ity, and the economic foundation of military power and security, al-
beit with asymmetrical threat perceptions and different priorities 
(Fang 2014). 
This article seeks to address a number of questions affecting Si-
no–Indian economic ties. First, what accounts for the growth in bi-
lateral trade and, to some extent, investment in bilateral relations? 
Second, what are the key impediments, political-diplomatic, bureau-
cratic-institutional, as well as economic, to expanding bilateral trade 
and investment? And third, how and to what extent has economic 
interdependence had a positive effect on security and, hence, been 
conducive to improving overall bilateral relations – or, in the China–
India case, why has the impact of the former on the latter remained 
rather limited? If anything, threat perceptions, competition and rival-
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ry, and the fundamental concern over national power tip the scales 
towards security rather than towards common economic gains; in-
deed, at times, this comes at the cost of potential economic coopera-
tion. To explore these questions, the article will use the economics–
security nexus as the prism through which developments in Sino–
Indian economic ties over the past quarter century are reviewed and 
analysed. 
The economics–security nexus is a critical factor in Sino–Indian 
relations. Essentially, two broad questions are often posed: first, 
whether or not, and to what extent, growing bilateral economic inter-
dependence reduces interstate conflicts; and second, to what extent 
security considerations slow down and impede expansion of econom-
ic ties from which both countries could potentially gain. There is a 
growing literature in international relations theory on the former 
question, while the latter has been receiving more attention from 
scholars and policymakers alike in recent years (Goldstein and Mans-
field 2012; Aggarwal and Govella 2013; Pempel 2013). Clearly, in the 
Sino–Indian case, growing economic ties over the past quarter of a 
century have been conducive to the gradual normalisation of bilateral 
relations. Nevertheless, security considerations can account for some 
of the difficulties in bilateral trade and investment.   
Economic security in an era of globalisation refers to a state’s 
ability to enhance its overall economic performance and competitive-
ness, reduce vulnerability in the areas of resources and energy sup-
plies, and prevent dominance of critical sectors by foreign entities. 
This requires a combination of industrial policy and government 
intervention that enables the state to benefit from growing economic 
interaction and integration through trade and investment facilitation 
and active participation in the global marketplace. Critics point out 
that advocates of economic security, while recognising the liberal 
international economic system of comparative advantage and accept-
ing certain risks as a condition, nonetheless hold strong mercantilist 
views and are more concerned with relative gains. Such perspectives, 
in turn, could impose limitations on the scope and scale of interna-
tional cooperation (Cheung and Gill 2013; Cable 1995; Kahler 2004; 
Grieco 1988). 
The notion of economic security also relates to the concept of 
geoeconomics, which was popularised in the 1990s after the end of 
the Cold War but has its roots in seventeenth-century mercantilism. 
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Geoeconomics describes how economic phenomena can both be the 
consequence of and further enhance national power, in the process 
changing the overall geopolitical order at the regional and interna-
tional level. Some now suggest that geoeconomics is increasingly 
trumping geopolitics in the absence of war (Baru 2012; Beeson 2015). 
The critical issue here is how states can apply economic power to 
advance national interests, which in turn informs and supports eco-
nomic diplomacy. There is a strong linkage between economic per-
formance and security that can reinforce each other. In essence, eco-
nomic security then involves  
safeguarding the structural integrity and prosperity-generating cap-
abilities and interests of a politico-economic entity in the context 
of various externalized risks and threats that confront it in the in-
ternational economic system. (Dent 2010: 244) 
In such a context, market access, techno-nationalism, protection of 
critical and sensitive domestic industries, reliable and affordable en-
ergy supplies, and so on, in contrast to the principles of free trade and 
laissez-faire, become the critical ingredients of economic security, also 
called the economics–security nexus (Ostry and Nelson 1995; Mas-
tanduno 1998; Tellis, Szalwinski, and Wills 2016). 
In the context of Sino–Indian relations, the economics–security 
nexus is a particularly useful prism through which some of the bilat-
eral trade and investment issues can be understood. While expanding 
economic ties have benefitted both countries over the past two and a 
half decades and, in fact, leaders in Beijing and New Delhi have 
sought to further promote their development, security and relative 
power have often been factored into economic decisions. For in-
stance, perennial and worsening trade deficits deeply concern New 
Delhi as these are perceived to both reflect unequal terms of trade 
between the two countries as China primarily exports manufactured 
goods to India while India’s exports to China are largely composed of 
raw materials. What is often characterised as “securitisation” of eco-
nomic issues also affects New Delhi’s decisions on Chinese invest-
ments and subregional cooperation if these are perceived to result in 
strategic sectors being exposed to Chinese access, influence, and con-
trol (Ravenhill 2013).  
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Sino–Indian Economic Ties since the 1980s 
In December 1988, Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi made a his-
toric visit to China, the first such visit by an Indian prime minister in 
34 years. One of the key decisions that the leaders of the two coun-
tries reached was that, given that territorial disputes could not be 
resolved in the near term, Beijing and New Delhi should nonetheless 
set aside their differences in order to explore expanding ties in other 
areas, of which trade became one of the top priorities. Also in that 
year, the two countries set up the India–China Joint Economic 
Group on Economic Relations and Trade, Science, and Technology 
(JEG). Bilateral trade experienced significant growth in the 1990s. In 
1990 it was only USD 264 million; by 2000, however, it had reached 
USD 2.9 billion. In 1995 two-way trade passed the USD 1 billion 
mark for the first time (see Table 1). Overall, bilateral trade grew by 
an average of 30 per cent annually during the 1990s (Dolla 2011: 134; 
Li 2004: 49; Wang 2009: 336). 
Table 1. China’s Trade with India, 1987–1999 (in million USD) 
Year Total Trade 
Chinese 
exports 
Chinese 
imports 
Balance 
1987 100.16 81.53 18.65 +62.88
1988 107.96 84.71 23.25 +61.46
1989 148.06 110.65 37.41 +73.24
1990 264.10 166.76 97.34 +69.42
1991 264.82 144.48 120.34 +24.14
1992 339.42 158.44 180.98 -22.54
1993 675.77 259.19 416.86 -157.67
1994 894.80  573.01 321.78 +151.23
1995 1,162.81 765.28 397.53 +367.75
1996 1,406.76 687.54 719.16 -31.62
1997 1,830.32 933.06 897.26 +35.80
1998 1,922.30 1,016.60 965.70 +110.90
1999 1,987.68 1,161.89 825.79 +336.17
Source: Wang 2009: 337. 
Despite lack of progress in border negotiation, bilateral economic ties – 
especially two-way trade – continued to experience rapid growth. 
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Growth in bilateral trade had been facilitated by the overall im-
provement in Sino–Indian relations in political and diplomatic 
spheres. Beijing and New Delhi set up a joint working group (JWG) 
on border negotiation in 1989. In 1993 and 1996, China and India 
signed two important agreements on military confidence-building 
measures in the border regions. President Jiang Zemin visited India in 
1996, the first-ever visit of a Chinese head of state to India (Sidhu 
and Yuan 2001). Between 1996 and 2005, China’s trade with India 
grew at twice its average annual global trade growth rate. China’s 
rapid economic development came with growing demands for raw 
materials, such as iron ore, which is a major export item for India. At 
the same time, India’s economic reform and trade liberalisation policy 
in the early 1990s had also resulted in the country’s expanding trade 
with the outside world, including with China. China’s accession into 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2011 also expanded its 
overseas export markets significantly, and this included India (Basu 
2001; Zhang et al. 2015). When Chinese President Hu Jintao visited 
India in 2006, the two countries signed the Bilateral Investment Pro-
motion and Protection Agreement and set a target of USD 40 billion 
in trade for 2010. Cooperation also expanded to include energy, agri-
culture, education, and technology (Gentleman 2006; Chu 2006).  
The 2007–2008 global financial crisis and the overall economic 
recession only temporarily affected bilateral trade, with 2009 experi-
encing a 25 per cent decline, to USD 38.6 billion. However, it soon 
recovered and reached USD 55.6 billion in 2010. Bilateral trade 
peaked in 2011 at USD 74 billion, before declining two years in a row 
to USD 66.57 billion in 2012 and USD 65.49 billion in 2013. While 
India ranked as China’s eighth-largest trading partner in 2011, for the 
past three years, it has not been among the top ten. The downward 
trend was reversed in 2014, when bilateral trade climbed back to 
USD 71.6 billion, which was still USD 15 billion below Brazil, Chi-
na’s tenth-ranked trading partner in that year (China Daily USA 2015). 
The USD 100 billion target for 2015 set by the two governments has 
yet to be achieved, but estimates suggest two-way trade could cross 
the USD 80 billion mark (Press Trust of India 2015; Xinhua 2016).  
Sino–Indian trade is primarily composed of Chinese exports of 
manufactured goods such as electrical machinery, iron and steel, or-
ganic chemicals, power equipment, and nuclear reactors, and Indian 
exports of resource-based items such as minerals (iron ore, slags), 
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copper, cotton, mineral fuel, and other raw materials (Mohanty 2014; 
Karackattu 2013: 7). For instance, in the 2014/2015 Indian fiscal 
year, the top five Chinese exports to India were valued at USD 36 
billion, constituting approximately 54 per cent of the total (USD 66.7 
billion); India’s top five exports to China, on the other hand, totalled 
USD 6.5 billion, almost 60 per cent (Livemint 2015). Over the past 
decade, Chinese coal power equipment exports have constituted 60 
per cent of India’s orders. In 2011 Reliance Power signed a USD 5 
billion Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with a consortium of 
Chinese state banks to finance building over 16 GW of coal power in 
India. China would also set up power equipment service centres in 
the industrial parks that had been agreed to during President Xi’s 
September 2014 visit to India (Hannam 2015). Meanwhile, the share 
of technology in bilateral trade has experienced slow but steady 
growth, led by the two countries’ technology firms in their efforts to 
make inroads into each other’s markets. These include Indian com-
panies such as Infosys and Satyam Computers, while Chinese firms 
from ZTE to Haier and Huawei Technologies have set up branches 
in India (Dolla 2011: 135). 
Several factors have contributed to the steady growth in Sino–
Indian economic ties. First and foremost, both Chinese and Indian 
leaders recognise the importance of trade and economic ties in the 
overall bilateral relationship and have made considerable efforts to 
promote them. Economic cooperation often features in joint state-
ments and declarations issued in the wake of Sino–Indian summit 
meetings. High-level official visits are often accompanied by entou-
rages of business executives and concluded with major business 
agreements and/or MoUs. With rapid growth in bilateral economic 
ties and what is seen as the generally comparable nature of the two 
economies, the term “Chindia” came into fashion – albeit only briefly – 
to highlight what the two countries could achieve together (Engardio 
2007). Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji, during his 2002 visit to India, 
captured this mood in a speech he delivered at Infosys, a top Indian 
software company. According to Zhu,  
It is widely recognised around the world that India is number one 
in software exports and China is number one in hardware. To-
gether we can become the world’s number one. (Ollapally 2014: 
345)  
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Likewise, Chinese President Xi Jinping refers to China and India as 
the “world’s factory” and “world’s back office,” respectively, and 
emphasises that together the two can contribute to global economic 
growth (Nair 2014).  
Indian prime minister Vajpayee’s 2003 visit to China represents a 
watershed event in bilateral relations. Not only had the two countries 
decided to move border negotiation to a higher level by appointing 
special representatives in recognition of the political significance of 
settling their territorial disputes, the visit also was marked by the two 
countries’ prioritisation of further expanding bilateral economic ties. 
A large entourage of Indian business executives accompanied the 
Indian prime minister. Of Vajpayee’s three important speeches deliv-
ered during his visit, two were given at business venues, including one 
in Shanghai on the subject of IT and potential Indo-Chinese coopera-
tion. A number of trade agreements were signed during the visit. 
Specifically, the two countries designated Changgu in Sikkim and 
Renqinggang in the Tibetan Autonomous Region as venues for bor-
der trade and agreed to use Nathu La as the pass for entry and exit to 
facilitate cross-border trade (Narayanan 2003; Kurian 2005; Roy 
2006). However, border trade grew slowly, with an accumulated total 
of only USD 1.55 million from 2006 to 2011. In 2012 there was 
much progress: close to USD 1.23 million in border trade within that 
year. In 2014, it grew to USD 1.59 million. Significant impediments 
remain, especially the lack of all-weather infrastructure and restric-
tions on the number of items that can be traded (Subba 2013; CRI 
2015). The two countries also actively explored the potential for re-
gional economic cooperation, including the subregional Kunming 
Initiative, which aimed to improve communication, travel, trade, and 
investment links among China, India, Bangladesh, and Myanmar (Ren 
2003).  
Another contributing factor is the institutionalisation of eco-
nomic ties. Over the years, a number of bilateral institutional mecha-
nisms have been set up to facilitate trade and investment, and to gen-
erally promote economic ties between the two countries. During 
Vajapayee’s visit in 2003, it was agreed in the joint Declaration on 
Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation that the 
two sides would  
set up a Joint Study Group (JSG) composed of officials and eco-
nomists to examine the potential complementarities between the 
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two countries in expanded trade and economic cooperation. (Min-
istry of External Affairs, Government of India 2003) 
The JSG recommended setting up a joint task force (JTF) to  
study in detail the feasibility of, and the benefits that may derive 
from, the China–India regional trade arrangements and also give 
recommendations regarding its content. (Sharma 2014: 734) 
Table 2. China’s Trade with India, 2000–2008 (in billion USD) 
Year 
Exports 
to India 
Imports 
from 
India 
Total 
trade 
% y-o-y 
growth 
China’s 
trade 
balance 
2000 1.6 1.3 2.9 46.6 0.2
2001 1.9 1.7 3.6 23.4 0.2
2002 2.7 2.3 4.9 37.5 0.4
2003 3.3 4.3 7.6 53.6 -0.9
2004 5.9 7.7 13.6 79.0 -1.8
2005 8.9 9.8 18.7 37.6 -0.8
2006 14.6 10.5 25.1 33.9 4.1
2007 24.0 14.7 38.7 54.4 4.1
2008 31.5 20.3 51.8 34.0 11.2
Sources: General Administration of Customs, People’s Republic of China, various years; 
Embassy of India in Beijing, various years. 
During Chinese state councillor Tang Jiaxuan’s visit to New Delhi in 
October 2004, the Chinese side proposed a free trade agreement 
(FTA) between the two countries. Subsequently, when Chinese prem-
ier Wen Jiabao visited India in April 2005, he announced that India 
and China had decided to institute a joint feasibility study on a poten-
tial FTA (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India 2003). 
Prior to Wen’s visit, the Chinese ambassador indicated that the Chi-
nese side was very interested in signing an FTA with India and this 
could significantly boost bilateral trade as the two countries were 
projected to become the world’s largest economies by 2050 (Asia 
Times 2005). Other institutions include joint working groups on trade, 
agriculture, and energy. In December 2010, the two countries agreed 
to set up the India–China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (SED). 
The first SED took place in Beijing on 26 September 2011. The latest 
round was held in March 2014, also in Beijing. Over 80 bilateral 
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agreements, MoUs, protocols on trade, investment, finance, civil 
aviation, and other topics have been signed between the two coun-
tries over the past few decades (Indian Embassy in Beijing 2015).  
Table 3. China’s Trade with India, 2009–2014 (in billion USD) 
Year Total 
Chinese 
exports 
Chinese 
imports 
% y-o-y 
change 
Trade 
balance 
2009 38.64 28.79 9.85 -12.5 18.93 
2010 55.58 38.16 17.42 +42 20.75 
2011a 73.9 50.04 23.4 +32.9 26.64 
2012 68.79 53.94 14.85 -7.6 39.09 
2013 65.9 51.39 14.56 -4.1 36.83 
2014 71.6 58.28 13.32 +8.6 44.96 
2015b 71.63 58.25 13.38 0 44.87 
Source: Ministry of Commerce,PRC, various years. 
a The Economic Times 2012.  
b Hindustan Times 2016. 
With the two countries’ combined global trade volume totalling USD 
4.6 trillion (in 2012), Sino–Indian trade has been sluggish despite the 
fact that both economies have sustained 7 per cent or higher growth 
rates over the past decade. India’s trade with China constitutes 7.9 
per cent of its total while for China, India accounts for less than 2 per 
cent of its overall trade. At the same time, economic frictions have 
surfaced in recent years. India’s trade deficit reached USD 36.8 billion 
in 2013 and a staggering USD 44.9 billion in 2014. Some Chinese 
scholars attributed the sharp increases in Indian deficits to New Delhi’s 
restrictions on iron ore exports to China. However, Indian analysts 
suggest that this is only part of the story. For instance, it is pointed 
out that while Indian iron ore exports to China have declined in re-
cent years, overall Indian exports have dropped much more steeply; 
this means that China has been buying less from India. For instance, 
in 2014, while India was not among the top ten trading partners of 
China, it ranked ninth as the latter’s export destination. Indeed, New 
Delhi has been pressing China to open up its market, especially for 
Indian IT, pharmaceuticals, and agriproducts, as well as increased 
Chinese investment to reduce the deficit (Singhal 2015; The Economic 
Times 2015c).  
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Given the sizes of their economies, strong growth potentials, 
and the low percentage of bilateral trade in their respective global 
trade, there is significant potential for growth. To explore opportuni-
ties for further economic cooperation, Beijing and New Delhi have 
undertaken a number of initiatives. The two countries have set up an 
SED and five working groups on infrastructure, energy, environmen-
tal protection, policy coordination, and high technology. Three 
rounds of dialogue have been held since 2011 (KPMG and IMC 
2013; Panda 2014). The two governments have also set up a joint 
study group to examine all trade-related issues, including trade imbal-
ance. Meanwhile, Indian states and Chinese provinces are also begin-
ning to explore economic opportunities at the substate level. An ini-
tial meeting of Indian chief ministers and Chinese provincial gover-
nors was held in Shanghai in mid-May 2015 (Mishra 2012; Rana 
2015).  
When Prime Minister Modi visited China in May 2015, the two 
sides signed deals worth USD 22 billion in an effort to boost bilateral 
trade and overall economic ties. Topping the deals is Bharti Airtel, 
the Indian telecoms group, which will receive USD 2.5 billion in 
credit lines from Chinese banks. Given the difficulty of competing 
with China in the manufacturing sector, to address the deficit issue 
New Delhi is turning to those sectors where it enjoys relative com-
parative advantage. Five sectors are targeted: information technology, 
pharmaceuticals, textiles, agricultural products, and tourism, with 
special emphasis among those on pharmaceuticals and tourism, 
where India sees a potential Chinese market (Mallet and Hornby 
2015; Srivastava 2015). A recent study suggests that some of India’s 
top exported products in its overall trade have not been able to gain 
access to the Chinese market. For instance, pharmaceutical products 
have been one of India’s top exports globally, but Indian drug com-
panies face considerably lengthy procedures to get approval – three 
years as compared to one year in the United States for similar clear-
ance (Karackattu 2013: 24).  
Tourism is an area with development potential. More than 100 
million Chinese tourists went abroad in 2013, but only 160,000 visited 
India. More than a decade ago, when the Sino–Indian direct flight 
route was opened, there was a lot of fanfare to celebrate the occasion. 
Years later, there is still only one direct flight between Beijing and 
Delhi (Air China), and no direct flights between Shanghai and Mum-
  Sino–Indian Economic Ties since 1988 43 

bai, the commercial hubs of the two countries (Martin 2015). Indeed, 
to attract Chinese tourists, India has launched a promotional cam-
paign, the “Glimpse of India,” in 12 Chinese cities. In 2012, 600,000 
Indian tourists visited China, nearly six times the number of Chinese 
visitors to India. New Delhi is seeking to change that (McLaughlin 
2014). During his visit to China, Modi announced at Tsinghua Uni-
versity that the Indian government had decided to “extend electronic 
tourist visas to Chinese nationals” in the hopes of boosting visits by 
Chinese tourists and to “strengthen people-to-people ties.” The years 
2015 and 2016 have been respectively designated as “Visit India” and 
“Visit China” years (Haidar 2015). Another area with potential for 
development is higher education. The number of Indian students in 
China has risen to 13,500, making India among the top ten countries 
sending students to study in China. Most of them are enrolled in 
clinical medical courses. There are reportedly also talks between Bei-
jing and Delhi on mutual degree recognition. Just a decade ago, only 
765 Indian students were studying in China. However, this remains a 
relatively low number considering that more than a quarter million 
Indian students study abroad (The Economic Times 2015a).  
Bilateral Investments and Services Sector 
Despite growth in bilateral trade over the years, the investment level 
remains very low. Accumulated Chinese FDI to India is approximate-
ly USD 800 million, representing about 0.4 per cent of all inflows of 
FDI into India, between 2000 and 2013 totalling USD 200 billion 
(Venu 2015). According to the Indian press, in 2013 China invested 
USD 100 billion in other countries, making it the third-largest source 
of outbound FDI. However, its accumulated investment in India 
between 2000 and 2014 amounts to only USD 410 million, well be-
hind the USD 22 billion from the United Kingdom, USD 17 billion 
from Japan, USD 13 billion from the Netherlands, and USD 1.9 bil-
lion from Spain. (This is all even including the USD 1.2 billion in-
vestment from Hong Kong.) By comparison, between 2005 and 
2012, China invested more than USD 25 billion in the ten members 
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (The Eco-
nomic Times 2014b; Chaturvedi 2014). 
As of March 2012, there were 166 Indian companies operating in 
China, with most located on China’s rich East Coast and in the tech-
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nology industries, such as IT/software and pharmaceuticals. These 
companies had been drawn to China both because of Beijing’s rela-
tively open economy and attractive tax incentives and because of 
New Delhi’s more restrictive policies on investment at home. Infosys 
and Wipro, for instance, have followed a low-cost expansion strategy, 
taking advantage of their competitive edge in programming talent to 
carve themselves a niche in the growing Chinese market (TJSIAD 
2012).  
India’s major software companies (Tata Consultancy Services, 
Infosys Technologies, Satyam Computer Services, and Wipro Tech-
nologies) have invested in China, and some of them have also devel-
oped collaborative projects with their Chinese counterparts (Zhang 
and Zhang 2006: 10). Tata Communications has entered into a part-
nership with China Telecom Global to offer live coverage of sports 
events in China, a market potential of USD 2.57 billion. Infosys 
Technologies began its China operation in 2003 with an investment 
of USD 5 million. It planned to recruit 6,000 employees and build 
two development centres in Shanghai and Hangzhou. It has also 
stated that it will invest USD 125–150 million to set up its own cam-
pus in Shanghai, the largest such investment outside of India. Wipro 
Ltd intends to open a third China delivery centre in the Northeast 
city of Dalian. India’s ICICI Bank is to open a new branch in Shang-
hai (Areddy 2015; TJSIAD 2012). Elsewhere, Bharti Airtel Ltd, a top 
Indian telecommunications carrier, is teaming up with China Mobile 
Ltd on growing fourth-generation (4G) mobile data services. Mean-
while, Huawei, another Chinese telecom giant, which has had busi-
ness in India for 15 years, recently announced it would open up a 
research and development centre with a USD 170 million investment, 
the company’s largest R&D centre outside of China (The Times of India 
2015b; Reuters 2015a, 2015b). 
Increasingly, joint ventures and partnerships have become an ef-
fective approach to overcoming investment barriers, in addition to 
the wholly owned foreign enterprise model. Long-term strategy, local 
knowledge, local sourcing and employment, and a willingness to be 
open and transparent in business practices have proven to be the 
winning tactics of gaining trust, consolidating a foothold, and ex-
panding business. Huawei, for instance, has made every effort to hire 
locals and source as many local components as possible. Of its more 
than 6,000 employees in India, 95 per cent are local hires. Huawei has 
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built large R&D and service centres in India, including a 5,000-seat 
one in Bangalore. Likewise, India’s Tata Consultancy Services (TCS), 
the IT arm of the Tata Group, found its way into China through 
collaboration with the government to provide IT service training. Of 
its 3,000 employees in China, 97 per cent are local hires (Swanson 
2014a). 
Table 4. Bilateral Investment (in million USD) 
Year 
Chinese investment in 
India 
Indian investment in 
China 
2006 – 52 
2007 16 34 
2008 49.1 257 
2009 – – 
2010 33 55 
2011a 95.90 42.17 
2012 154 44 
2013 2,763a – 
2014 243 50.75
 
564b 
Source: Embassy of India, Beijing, China (n.d.). 
a Through Dec 2013 (cumulative, China’s non-financial investment in India). 
b Through 2014 Indian investment in China (cumulative). 
Increasing Chinese investment to India has been recognised as one 
way to address the trade imbalance issue. An MoU on cooperation on 
industrial parks in India was signed by the two countries in June 2014 
to compensate for India’s growing trade deficits (The Times of India 
2014). Subsequently, during President Xi Jinping’s first official visit to 
India in September 2014, China pledged USD 20 billion to develop 
the infrastructure of two industrial parks (in Maharashtra and Guja-
rat) over the next five years. There had been speculation prior to Xi’s 
arrival that China was to invest a whopping USD 100 billion to out-
number Tokyo’s USD 35 billion, which had been promised during 
Prime Minister Modi’s earlier visit to Japan. Analysts at the time dis-
missed that USD 100 billion as an unrealistic figure (Mallet and 
Hornby 2015; Pandey 2014; Gupta and Wang 2014). The two coun-
tries’ commerce ministers signed a five-year trade and economic de-
velopment plan that aims to promote sustainability and address trade 
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imbalance, including access to Chinese markets for Indian pharma-
ceutical and agricultural goods. Also under discussion were a possible 
USD 50 billion future Chinese investment in modernising India’s 
railway systems and a possible USD 50 billion for India’s infrastruc-
ture development (Nataraj and Sekhani 2014). China and India are 
likely to cooperate on railways, where India’s out-of-date system 
could benefit from China’s experiences in developing the country’s 
national high-speed rails networks. The Modi government has recent-
ly approved 100 per cent FDI in India’s high-speed rail system. An 
action plan was signed during Modi’s visit to China, which includes 
cooperation in the following areas: the speed-raising of existing 
routes (Chennai–Bengaluru–Mysore), a high-speed rail (Delhi–Nag-
pur sector or Delhi–Chennai route), railway station re-development, 
heavy-haul training, and the establishment of a “railway university” 
(Ministry of External Affairs 2015; The Economic Times 2014a; Aneja 
2014a; Mahajan 2014). The Chinese side, not surprisingly, is pushing 
to start a pilot project covering part of the route from New Delhi to 
Chennai, in what one Chinese feasibility study has suggested could 
eventually become a mega USD 36 billion bullet train project (Miglani 
2015).  
The Modi government is eager to attract more Chinese invest-
ment. When Modi was the chief minister of Gujarat, the state’s rela-
tively more liberal policy on foreign investment was credited for the 
reported USD 500 million investment in green energy and in a power-
equipment-manufacturing facility by Tebian Electrical Apparatus 
Stock Company, an energy-equipment manufacturer based in Xin-
jiang (Swanson 2014a). Karnataka’s chief minister, Siddaramaiah, 
accompanied Modi on his May 2015 visit to China; analysts have 
suggested that Karnataka could be the next state to host Chinese 
industrial parks. Haryana and Uttar Pradesh are other Indian states 
interested in hosting similar industrial parks or zones. The Indian side 
pledges to create a more open environment for foreign investments, 
including from Chinese companies (Basu 2015; Reuters 2014; Krish-
nan 2014). Some analysts have projected that Chinese investment into 
India will total USD 30 billion between now and 2025, given the 
growing trade between the two countries, and with it, the necessity of 
manufacturing goods and developing infrastructure in India (The 
Times of India 2014). Xiaomi, an up-and-coming Chinese cell phone 
company, has recently committed to local production in India. Top 
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executives have pledged to invest and undertake research and devel-
opment in a fast-growing market currently dominated by Samsung 
Electronics and Micromax, a local firm. It recently launched its Mi 4i 
phone in New Delhi, which is specially designed for India. It also 
plans to invest in Indian tech start-ups, as the world’s third-largest 
smartphone company expands its markets outside of China, with the 
goal of becoming the number one handset brand in India by 2020 
(Lee 2015; Carsten 2015; Mozur and Rai 2015). China’s Alibaba is 
reportedly planning to buy a stake worth approximately USD 550 
million in India’s One97 Communications Ltd, a major investment 
for Alibaba in India’s fast-growing online business (Barria 2015).
Soon after Prime Minister Modi’s 2015 visit to China, the Indian 
national security advisor, Ajit Doval, gave the green light to the Bank 
of China to open up a branch in Mumbai. This is part of the reform 
that New Delhi has undertaken to encourage foreign banks to expand 
their business in India. Currently, a single branch of just one Chinese 
bank, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, operates in India 
(Mumbai) (The Economic Times 2015b; Basu Indrajit 2013). In July 
2015, India’s Ministry of Home Affairs approved a 19-month-old 
proposal from Huawei, China’s telecommunications giant, to set up a 
unit in Tamil Nadu, a state in Southeast India near Sri Lanka. How-
ever, separate security clearance is required for foreign nationals to be 
appointed top executives and the company is expected to reserve top 
technical positions for Indian nationals (Sharma 2015). In recent 
years, India has also sought to attract investment from Chinese prov-
inces, including those in its Western interior. China’s accumulated 
outward foreign investment was already an impressive USD 660 bil-
lion by 2014, and Beijing has set its target to increase it to USD 1.25 
trillion over the next decade; New Delhi sees an opportunity in this, 
particularly in attracting Chinese investment into its industrial parks 
(Aneja 2014b).  
It is often suggested that the level and scope of investment in 
other countries reflects the investing country’s confidence in the host 
country’s overall investment environment, potential for economic 
growth, and long-term stable political relationship. Growing econom-
ic interdependence, of which investment is a good indicator, also can 
have a stabilising impact on interstate relations, including in terms of 
conflicts and war (Mansfield and Pollins 2003). The fact that the level 
of Sino–Indian investment has remained low can be attributed to a 
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number of reasons, including legal, infrastructural, commercial, and 
security considerations. Infrastructure remains a major factor that can 
deter prospective investors, including Chinese ones. Chronic power 
failure and lack of good roads impede foreign investment into India 
(The Times of India 2015a). Security concerns are another impediment 
to investment. The Indian Air Force recently imposed a ban on the 
use of handsets manufactured by Xiaomi. It has been suggested that 
security concerns have led the Modi government to grant Japan the 
contract to build a high-speed rail (Roy 2015). At the same time, Chi-
nese companies neither are familiar with nor receive the services that 
Western and Japanese companies enjoy, given those companies’ 
longer history of doing business in India. But, fundamentally, Chinese 
investment typically goes to resources and raw materials sectors, 
which are critical commodities that China seeks to exploit and import 
(Martin 2014). At the same time, Indian investment encounters issues 
of intellectual property protection as well as regulatory clarity.  
India’s bureaucratic red tape continues to be a major inhibiting 
factor in attracting FDI. One example is the involvement of the 
Shanghai Urban Construction Group Corporation (SUCGC), which 
in 2012 won a contract to build part of a 9.37-kilometre-long subway 
tunnel in downtown New Delhi in partnership with Larsen & 
Toubro, India’s largest engineering and construction company. How-
ever, for months in 2013, the work was stalled pending approval by 
India’s railway bureau. Obtaining visas for SUCGC’s employees pre-
sented another problem (Swanson 2014a). India’s labour laws and 
visa requirements for foreign nationals also impose significant bu-
reaucratic hurdles for doing business in the country. Chinese staff 
working on projects in India, for instance, are required to renew their 
work visas every three months and this must be done through Indian 
visa offices in China (Anonymous 1 2015).  
Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar Economic 
Corridor (BCIM-EC) 
Beijing and New Delhi are also exploring new avenues for economic 
cooperation through regional and subregional arrangements. China 
has been an observer member of the South Asian Association Re-
gional Cooperation (SAARC) since 2005, while India was granted 
observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in 
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the same year. Both organisations seek to strengthen regional eco-
nomic cooperation although neither has made significant progress so 
far. It is at the subregional and transregional levels, however, that 
Beijing in recent years has taken the initiative to push for greater 
connectivity to enable future infrastructural developments and eco-
nomic cooperation. In Indonesia in 2013, President Xi Jinping pro-
posed the concept of a “Twenty-First Century Maritime Silk Road” 
that would start from Fujian’s Quanzhou, run through the Strait of 
Malacca, continue to Kolkata and across the northern Indian Ocean, 
then go on to connect Nairobi all the way to Europe. Together with 
the “Silk Road Economic Belt” (which Xi proposed during his visit 
to Kazakhstan), the concept of “One Belt, One Road” represents the 
ambition of the Xi–Li government to expand economic cooperation 
with the relevant countries, which combined have a total population 
of 4.4 billion and a GDP of USD 21 trillion – respectively, 63 per 
cent and 29 per cent of the global total. In 2013 China’s trade with 
these countries amounted to more than USD 1 trillion, approximately 
a quarter of China’s total foreign trade (Global Asia 2015; Zhu 2014: 
13). Beijing has committed USD 40 billion for the Silk Road Fund 
and has invited India to join the undertaking. New Delhi has yet to 
decide whether it should join. Part of the hesitance is concern over 
Chinese intentions, as some in India suspect the “Maritime Silk 
Road” of being an economic version of the “String of Pearls” 
scheme. Nevertheless, Indian participation in the project would po-
tentially help it draw much-needed investment (Nataraj 2015). 
The BCIM Forum for Regional Cooperation has evolved from 
the Kunming Initiative, a Track-II activity that originated from a 
conference on regional cooperation and development between China, 
India, Myanmar, and Bangladesh that was held in in Kunming, the 
capital city of Yunnan Province, in 1999. The idea was to re-establish 
the old overland connection between China and India through My-
anmar and Bangladesh by developing road, rail, and air transport links 
to facilitate flows of goods, investment, and people (Hussain 2014). 
The BCIM represents 9 per cent of the world’s landmass and 40 per 
cent of its population. Due to various reasons, the initiative moved 
slowly. In 2012 the combined foreign trade of the four countries was 
USD 4.73 trillion, about 13 per cent of the global total, while intrare-
gional trade between the four countries accounted for about 5 per 
cent, in comparison to the 35 per cent accounted for by intra-
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ASEAN trade. There are more than 440 million people living in the 
subregion covered by the BCIM: India’s Northeast, China’s Yunnan, 
Bangladesh, and Myanmar (Chen and Liu 2013). The idea behind the 
BCIM is to fully exploit the comparative advantages of the four 
countries, focus on the three types of connectivity – transport, trade, 
and people – through infrastructure development, resource explora-
tion, market access, and reduction of non-tariff barriers – so that all 
would benefit from and work toward subregional economic integra-
tion (Rahman 2014). Writing in The Daily Star, a Bangladeshi news-
paper, the Chinese ambassador pointed out the BCIM’s important 
location at the intersection of the “Economic Belt along the Silk 
Road” and the “Maritime Silk Road,” with the potential of combining 
the China–ASEAN FTA, India–ASEAN FTA, and the intra-ASEAN 
FTA into the world’s largest free trade area (Li 2014). 
In 2012 the BCIM Business Council was established by the four 
countries’ most eminent national trade associations. During Chinese 
premier Li Keqiang’s visit to India in May 2013, the two countries 
noted  
the progress made in promoting cooperation under the BCIM 
(Bangladesh, China, India, Myanmar) Regional Forum. Encour-
aged by the successful BCIM Car Rally of February 2013 between 
Kolkata and Kunming, the two sides agreed to consult the other 
parties with a view to establishing a Joint Study Group on strength-
ening connectivity in the BCIM region for closer economic, trade, 
and people-to-people linkages and on initiating the development 
of a BCIM Economic Corridor. (Ministry of External Affairs 
2013)  
The BCIM Economic Corridor would allow the four countries to 
exploit and benefit from the existing complementarity in their respec-
tive natural endowments, especially in energy, transport, and trade 
(Sahoo and Bhunia 2014). Already, China’s Yunnan Province is team-
ing up with India’s West Bengal in promoting business opportunities, 
and seeking to be the engine of the BCIM-EC. This follows a similar 
partnership between Guizhou Province and Andhra Pradesh in a 
USD 3.5 billion project in the Kakinada Special Economic Zone 
located in Andhra Pradesh (Aneja 2015b). To a great extent, India’s 
Northeast, as a landlocked, isolated, and less developed area, would 
benefit from infrastructural development, greater exposure to trade, 
and the development of its rich natural resources. However, for dec-
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ades, chronic insurgency, corruption, and political instability, along 
with security considerations, have basically meant that economic 
development in this region has never been given sufficient attention 
by New Delhi. The BCIM offers the prospect of changing that, but 
significant obstacles still need to be overcome (Bhattacharjee 2015).   
However, for all intents and purposes, the BCIM remained on 
the drawing board for 14 years after it was conceived, until very re-
cently, when it finally got recognition from New Delhi as a potentially 
critical part of its Look East Policy. It has now moved from the by-
and-large Track-II format to an official forum endorsed by all four 
governments (although China and Myanmar have from the very be-
ginning had more official involvement in the undertaking than have 
India and Bangladesh). The Singh–Li Joint Statement of May 2013 
and the first intergovernmental study group meeting held in Kunming 
in December 2013 may have signalled the beginning of the next 
phase, but there remains considerable hesitance and reluctance on 
India’s part regarding this subregional cooperation initiative, for a 
number of reasons. It is concerned that opening up its Northeastern 
states to border transportation routes and trade may have security 
implications. Indeed, while infrastructural development in India’s 
Northeast could benefit from Chinese funds, New Delhi has so far 
been rather reticent on this and is not in favour of reviving the old 
Burma/Stilwell Road for security reasons. Updating the 312-kilo-
metre portion of the Burma Road linking India’s Northeast and Chi-
na’s Yunnan Province through northern Myanmar could cut trans-
portation costs between China and India by 30 per cent. At the same 
time, the sheer power of China’s economy means any such subre-
gional arrangement could be dominated by China and it is less clear 
what, if any, benefits will be gained by India’s less developed North-
east (Sahoo and Bhunia 2014; Anand 2014; Uberoi 2013; Basu 
Pratnashree 2013).  
Meanwhile, New Delhi is also part of and has great stakes in the 
Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral and Technical Cooperation 
(BIMSTEC) that connects India’s Northeast region (NER) to Myan-
mar, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Thailand, and Sri Lanka. BIMSTEC 
was established in June 1997 and aims to promote cooperation 
among members in various sectors such as trade, energy, technology, 
transport, among others, and serves as a bridge between South and 
Southeast Asia. From a geopolitical standpoint, and given the eco-
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nomic complementarity, New Delhi would prefer the BIMSTEC over 
the BCIM, with the former also serving important interests of India’s 
“Look East” policy. Over the past five years, BIMSTEC trade with 
India has sustained a faster growth rate than that between the BCIM 
and India, although the BCIM’s share of trade with India remains 
larger than BIMSTEC’s. It is because of the slow progress in the 
BIMSTEC that the Indian government has begun attaching more 
importance to the BCIM (Sharma and Rathore 2015; Juergens 2014). 
With two intergovernmental JSG meetings already having been held, 
the four countries have agreed to focus on the following seven areas: 
connectivity; energy; trade; finance and investment; human develop-
ment and poverty alleviation; sustainable developments; and people-
to-people contacts. Initial estimates put the total costs of BCIM pro-
jects at USD 22 billion (Vaid and Maini 2015).  
Recent reports suggest that New Delhi may have finally decided 
it is time to overcome and manage some of the strategic concerns 
that had kept India from fully embracing the BCIM. With Modi now 
pushing an “Act East” policy as a replacement for the previous 
“Look East” policy, the potential benefits that the BCIM-EC can 
bring to India’s NER in economic development, peace, and stability 
seem increasingly promising. The 2,800-kilometre Kunming–Kolkata 
four-lane highway is nearly ready, with only 200 kilometres on the 
Indian side of the border left to be completed. Once open, this will 
greatly enhance the connectivity between the four countries, facilitat-
ing trade, investment, and the development of resources in this land-
locked subregion (Hariharan 2015; Aneja 2015a). However, whether 
this will be realised is predicated on India’s assessments of the overall 
benefits and potential risks. China is likely to dominate whatever final 
economic arrangement agreed upon should the BCIM-EC move 
forward. At the same time, allowing Chinese inroads into India’s 
NER and access to the Bay of Bengal might enhance only Beijing’s 
geostrategic interests, potentially at the cost of India’s security inter-
ests. Indeed, New Delhi remains wary of China’s growing economic 
presence in South Asia as Beijing actively pursues its “Maritime Silk 
Road” strategy (Uberoi 2014; Anderson and Ayres 2015). 
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Challenges and Prospects for Sino–Indian 
Trade and Investment 
The challenges that China and India face in their economic relations 
can be explained through the economic-security prism or the eco-
nomics–security nexus. Ironically, this is an area that should allow the 
two countries, given the complementary structures of their econom-
ies and their growing trade and investment ties, to benefit from com-
parative advantage, to further their economic interdependence and 
therefore raise the cost of conflict, and to bring about mutual gains – 
corresponding exactly to the two governments’ top priorities. How-
ever, this apparent win-win scenario has yet to materialise. Bilateral 
trade turnovers, while growing steadily over the years, remain dispro-
portionately low compared to those of China’s top ten trading part-
ners. China’s total foreign trade in 2014 stood at USD 4.3 trillion, of 
which Sino–Indian trade accounted for only USD 71.6 billion, a dis-
mal 1.6 per cent. There are multiple reasons, both political and eco-
nomic, that explain the limitations and slow pace of what could have 
been much larger volumes of trade and investment. First, strategic 
mistrust or even rivalry, along with unresolved issues ranging from 
territorial disputes to China’s special relationship with Pakistan to the 
Tibet issue, will continue to impede the pace and scope of bilateral 
economic ties. Even where purely economic matters are concerned, 
the much-touted Sino–Indian complementarity, where China’s manu-
facturing prowess (hardware) and India’s information edge (software) 
combined to present a rosy picture of Chindia, is now under serious 
reconsideration in both geopolitical and economic terms. A closer 
examination of the bilateral economic structure reveals the fact that 
the relations between these two emerging economic giants are as 
much competitive as they are complementary. In some areas, compe-
tition can become even more intensified as the two countries contin-
ue on their development trajectories. Competition for energy, for 
example, has already become an area of concern in terms of security 
for both countries (Mallet 2005).  
At the same time, the two countries are likely also locked in 
competition for capital and resources while their respective compara-
tive advantages do not automatically translate into expanded trade 
opportunities, largely because of bureaucratic impediments, security 
concerns, and cultural barriers. For instance, major Chinese telecom-
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munications firms such as Huawei and ZTE have been banned from 
bidding for contracts to supply GSM (global system for mobile 
communications) lines in India’s northern and eastern zones, because 
Indian national security officials are concerned that “Chinese telecom 
equipment can be used for spying or [be] infected with malware” (The 
Economic Times 2010). Meanwhile, China’s own ambition to become a 
software power means it is reluctant to cede market access to the 
Indian software industry even though the latter has gained significant 
prestige globally. Indeed, more than 70 per cent of India’s software 
service exports go to Western markets but only 10 per cent is sold to 
China (Huang 2011).  
As discussed before, one of the major obstacles in Sino–Indian 
economic ties is the perennial trade imbalance where India sustains 
significant, and growing, deficits. According to New Delhi, the more 
the two countries trade, the more deficits it seems India will suffer. A 
constant complaint from the Indian side is the flooding of the Indian 
market with cheap Chinese goods. From low-value products such as 
toys to higher-value consumer goods like electronics, Chinese im-
ports have been a major problem for small Indian businesses. For 
instance, Chinese solar panels sell at half the price of Indian-made 
ones and take up approximately 60 to 70 per cent of the Indian solar 
market share (Upadhyay 2015). The Modi government is seeking to 
gain more market access to China and to attract Chinese investment 
to India to address the trade imbalance issue.  
If there is to be a future for an India–China bilateral trade rela-
tionship, then the worrying issue of the trade deficit has to be ad-
dressed, 
said Rajeev Kher, Indian commerce secretary, on the eve of Modi’s 
visit to China (Sen 2015).  
Chronic trade imbalance has already led New Delhi to take dras-
tic measures. India is already imposing a 21 per cent duty on power 
equipment imported from China, an issue raised at the recent meeting 
of the Joint Economic Group, along with investment, trade remedies, 
and other matters (Srivastava 2012). India is also raising the import 
duty on steel, the goal of which is to stem cheap supplies from China 
and Russia (Reuters 2015c; Sharma 2014: 740). Between 1995 and 
2011, India initiated 147 anti-dumping cases against China (while 
China had only four against India), 120 of which ended in Chinese 
products being hit by penalties. In effect, every fourth anti-dumping 
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case from India is directed towards China. One study comments: 
“No other country worldwide is targeted by its trading partner as 
frequently as China by India” (Vandenbussche and Viegelahn 2012: 
2). New Delhi is asking the Chinese side to invest in India to manu-
facture these products as a way to provide job opportunities in India 
but earn profits for Chinese companies (Deccan Herald 2015). The 
Federation of Indian Export Organisations (FIEO) has also come out 
proposing to sign a free trade agreement with China to boost Indian 
exports. However, Indian manufacturing industry lobbying groups, 
such as the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Indus-
try (FICCI), are opposed to such an arrangement, believing the fur-
ther reduction of tariffs would harm Indian industry (The Economic 
Times 2014; Anderson and Geiger 2010). It has been pointed out that 
China remains much more competitive than India in manufacturing 
and therefore any further reduction in tariffs would only result in 
greater Chinese exports to India (Huchet 2008). Indeed, cheap Chi-
nese imports are viewed by some in India as a “slow killer,” a threat 
to India’s manufacturing industry, and the country’s National Security 
Council has projected that by the 2014/2015 fiscal year “75 per cent 
of Indian manufacturing will depend on imports from China.” At the 
same time, Indian companies, even those in the more competitive 
sectors such as pharmaceuticals and IT technology, find it difficult to 
penetrate China’s market (Singh 2011). Even in pharmaceuticals, the 
sector where India should have a comparative advantage, an anomaly 
exists whereby India, which produces one-third of the world’s medi-
cines in the form of generic drugs, has to rely on China, as more than 
80 per cent of the raw materials for these drugs come from there 
(Kannan 2014). 
However, analysts point out that India’s paranoia about its trade 
deficit with China misses an important point: India typically runs 
deficits with most of its trading partners (16 out of 25) simply be-
cause it does not produce enough goods to meet domestic market 
demands. In fact, India’s deficit as a percentage of bilateral trade with 
some countries is much higher than it is with China, which was ap-
proximately 55 per cent in the 2013/2014 fiscal year. By comparison, 
it is 90, 83, and 62 per cent, respectively, vis-à-vis Iraq, Switzerland, 
and Australia. Indeed, some argue that Indian imports of Chinese 
consumer goods help raise people’s living standards while Chinese 
capital goods at lower prices allow Indian businesses that depend on 
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importing machinery and power equipment to use the savings else-
where to grow jobs and the Indian economy (Palit 2014; Swanson 
2014b). 
Numerous obstacles exist to India and China developing a bilat-
eral strategic relationship, which is a key factor in facilitating trade 
and investment expansion. These are political-strategic, including 
territorial, disputes, the Tibet issue, the China–India–Pakistan triangle – 
especially Beijing’s continuing support of Islamabad, and the US fac-
tor. On the economic front, India has yet to recognise China’s market 
status even though India itself is much less open with its numerous 
non-tariff barriers. New Delhi remains reluctant to negotiate an FTA 
with Beijing, even though a joint feasibility study was concluded in 
2007. Formal negotiation has yet to begin and there is a lack of con-
sensus, largely due to uncertainty about the likely negative impacts on 
those sectors that are most vulnerable to competition as a result of 
significant reduction or even elimination of tariffs. As the two mar-
kets open up to each other, there are bound to be major disruptions, 
and the two countries need to set up dispute resolution and contin-
gent protection measures. There are widespread concerns in India 
that an FTA would benefit China much more than it would India, as 
the lowering of tariffs would allow for massive inflows of Chinese-
made goods into the Indian market, aggravating the trade imbalance 
problem (Yu, Shen, and Wang 2014; Yang 2013).  
There is deep and mutual distrust between the two countries, es-
pecially among the security analysts, and it is more prevalent in India. 
Among the Chinese and Indian people there is insufficient mutual 
understanding. A 2014 Pew Global Poll suggests approximately 30 
per cent of the Chinese hold a favourable view of India, and vice 
versa, while more than 50 per cent of people in both countries have a 
favourable view of the United States. The Confucius Institutes in 
India, meant to promote Chinese language and culture, have yet to 
play a meaningful role, due to security concerns and disputes over 
teaching methods (Pew Research Center 2014; Martin 2014). Despite 
growing economic ties, India’s understanding of China and vice versa 
remains shallow, misconstrued, and at times misguided by ignorance 
and stereotypical perceptions. Neither country has made any serious 
attempt to address these perceptual problems. For instance, only a 
few Indian journalists are based in China (The Economist 2014). 
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In recent years, especially since the Xi Jinping–Li Keqiang ad-
ministration and the Modi government came into power in 2013–
2014, significant efforts have been made to expand economic ties, 
through liberalisation of some of the restrictions and incentives to 
attract capital. This is in response to the chronic trade imbalance in 
Sino–Indian trade and the existing market barriers in both countries. 
However, realising the potential and making investment work still 
requires a whole set of policies that must be implemented in both 
countries to provide the regulatory and facilitating environments. In 
general, from national leaders (and increasingly local ones as well) to 
business communities, there is consensus that if managed well, and if 
certain perennial issues such as the trade imbalance can be properly 
handled and addressed, there is no reason why Sino–Indian economic 
ties cannot grow further, given the size of their economies and their 
rising middle classes. Several factors are at play. 
First, there is significant commitment from both sides to further 
developing bilateral economic ties, as economic development remains 
a top priority for both Beijing and New Delhi. In China, the goals set 
for the two “Hundred Years” (2021 to mark the 100th anniversary of 
the CCP, 2049 to mark the 100th anniversary of the founding of the 
PRC) require balanced and sustainable economic growth. The 2007–
2008 global financial crisis and economic recession have greatly af-
fected Chinese exports to their traditional markets as a result of de-
clining consumer demands. This has forced Beijing to make adjust-
ments, including seeking new markets as well as encouraging domes-
tic consumption. For the Modi government, the promise of econom-
ic growth was key to the BJP’s winning the 2014 Indian elections, and 
New Delhi has all the incentives to attract investment and promote 
“Make in India.” It is not surprising that recent China–India summits 
have placed significant emphasis on promoting Sino–Indian economic 
ties (Sharma 2014). For instance, during Prime Minister Modi’s 2015 
visit to China, 24 agreements worth a total of USD 22 billion were 
signed. In the joint statement released after Premier Li Keqiang’s 
2013 state visit to India, both sides reiterated the USD 100 billion 
trade turnover target for 2015 and committed themselves to address-
ing the trade imbalance and cooperation in IT, finance and banking, 
and industrial parks. 
Second, the sizes of the two economies and their growing middle 
classes provide potential future markets for goods, services, and in-
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vestment opportunities. India’s economic reform began in 1991 and 
within years bilateral trade crossed the USD 1 billion mark (1995). 
Although it has experienced significant slowdown in the past few 
years, the growth rate of India’s economy is poised to rival, perhaps 
even overtake, China’s in the coming years, and that could lead to an 
expanding market and growing demands for consumer goods (Zhong 
and Kala 2015). Chinese power equipment already accounts for over 
60 per cent of Indian orders, and Chinese telecommunications and 
smartphone manufacturers are also expanding their market shares in 
India. Chinese consumer goods remain competitive in India. How-
ever, as China continues to pursue economic reforms and expand its 
service sector, India’s IT sectors, pharmaceutical makers, and finan-
cial services could also tap into China’s market. The complementary 
nature of the two economies is conducive to further expansion of 
bilateral economic ties (Chaudhury 2015). 
Third, in recent years, economic ties between China and India 
have expanded to include subnational and subregional interactions. 
The BCIM-EC, when fully operating, could inject much-needed en-
ergy into India’s NER and China’s southwestern provinces, both 
landlocked, while at the same time connecting Bangladesh and Myan-
mar, as well as China and India, in order that the subregion’s rich 
resources be explored and flows of trade, investment, and people-to-
people contacts be facilitated, turning the BCIM-EC into an import-
ant intersection in the “One Road, One Belt” initiative. The transpor-
tation connectivity will greatly reduce the time and cost of doing 
business between the two countries and assist development in each 
country’s less developed regions. Meanwhile, India’s states and Chi-
na’s provinces are also beginning to explore areas of cooperation, in 
particular where the latter could provide financial resources to assist 
infrastructure development and form economic partnerships. Indeed, 
recent years have seen growing interactions between Indian state 
chief ministers and Chinese provincial leaders, and the establishment 
of sister-city arrangements. There is also a proposal for an annual 
forum of subnational leaders of the two countries (Maini 2015).  
Fourth, a free trade agreement between these fast-growing econ-
omies could also unleash tremendous market growth in both coun-
tries. Chinese analysts suggest that a free trade agreement between the 
two countries could significantly enhance bilateral relations, strength-
en the strategic partnership, and benefit the two emerging economies 
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in many positive ways, including promoting growth in trade and in-
vestment, deepening economic reform and restructuring to be more 
open and competitive in the global economy, and reducing poverty in 
the relatively poor and underdeveloped regions of both countries, not 
to mention enhancing mutual political trust, improving the manage-
ment of bilateral disputes, and cooperating in non-traditional security 
areas such as energy, food, health, and terrorism, among others (Yang 
2013; Yu, Shen, and Wang 2014). 
Conclusion 
Sino–Indian trade has experienced a significant expansion since the 
late 1980s. From a mere USD 100 million in 1987, it has grown to 
over USD 70 billion today. Despite the lack of, or slow progress in, 
border negotiation, and notwithstanding occasional standoffs in the 
disputed territories along the Line of Actual Control, the two coun-
tries have managed to promote trade, encourage investment, and seek 
economic cooperation with one another. Although in the past few 
years, marked by the overall global and domestic economic slow-
down, bilateral trade has not grown at a speed originally targeted, 
Beijing and New Delhi remain committed to reaching USD 100 bil-
lion, although that target – originally set for 2015 – has been missed. 
At the same time, the two governments have also sought to address 
the issue of trade imbalance through investment and market access. 
However, there are significant obstacles that must be overcome be-
fore Sino–Indian economic ties can ascend. There are signs that cau-
tious optimism is called for, but getting there requires that Beijing and 
New Delhi seriously address each other’s security concerns, including 
those areas that affect their perceptions of economic security and, 
consequently, their policies toward bilateral and regional cooperation.  
The trade imbalance, which has increased rapidly since 2008 and 
whereby India is incurring an ever-growing deficit, is a major imped-
iment to the further expansion of bilateral trade, as New Delhi ab-
hors the thought that more trade means more deficit for India, whose 
manufacturing industries cannot compete with China’s, while its rela-
tively more competitive sectors such as IT, services, and pharmaceu-
ticals have gained only limited access to Chinese markets. At the same 
time, there has been little change in the composition and terms of 
trade between the two countries – China is exporting manufactured 
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goods while India is exporting mainly commodities such as iron ore. 
This puts India at a considerable disadvantage in trade as the deficit 
increases and Chinese products further flood its market. It does not 
appear that in the short term, the issue of trade imbalance can be 
resolved. In recent years, the two governments have made efforts to 
address this problem, including allowing greater market access to 
Indian IT, services, and pharmaceutical companies and expanding 
Chinese investment in India’s power and infrastructure sectors. In 
addition, Beijing and New Delhi have also agreed to elevate the dec-
ade-old BCIM Forum to the official level, opening up the prospect of 
the original concept of connectivity of transport, trade, and people 
finally being lifted from the drawing board and being implemented.  
However, even in areas where further progress in expanding 
trade and investment can benefit both countries, especially those 
landlocked and less developed subregions – China’s southwestern 
province of Yunnan and India’s NER – there is as much hesitation as 
there is recognition of the need for development, in particular from 
New Delhi’s perspective. Concerns over Chinese economic domina-
tion aside, the more serious consideration is about security, as part of 
the region is still contested by China. Poor infrastructure, transborder 
intrusions and conflicts, and social instability are also intimidating and 
inhibiting factors against investments. Likewise, the idea of a free 
trade agreement between the two countries has also stagnated even 
though a bilateral feasibility study was completed in 2007. Clearly, 
economic security considerations about relative gains, competiveness, 
and vulnerability reduction have so far prevented China and India 
from achieving the economic potential the two emerging markets can 
offer.  
In fact, taken as a whole, growing economic interdependence has 
yet to transform and overcome the difficulties in bilateral relations 
(Tellis 2006; Rapkin and Thompson 2006). At the same time, mutual 
distrust, strategic rivalry or simply hedging, and unresolved issues 
have hampered but not significantly impeded the development of the 
economic relationship. Many of the challenges in further expanding 
trade and investments are largely the result of the economic structure, 
terms of trade, investment environment, and the competitive nature 
of some of the industries (Ollapally 2014). While the structural condi-
tions in both security and economic interdependence between China 
and India affect their economics–security nexus, I agree with Ollapal-
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ly that elite perceptions and leadership priorities can influence the 
choice of policies taken and implemented within the broader context 
of weighing opportunities and risks. In this regard, it appears that the 
leadership in both Beijing and New Delhi have their priorities set on 
economic development and prosperity, of which trade and invest-
ment constitute an important component. Granted, much more is 
required to overcome obstacles to trade and investment, not just 
from commitments of the two governments, but also adjustments in 
domestic regulatory environments governing labour, visas, and mar-
ket access, among other things. Ultimately, the extent and depth of 
bilateral economic ties will be a function of how Beijing and New 
Delhi view the benefits of growing trade and investment in both 
absolute and relative gains terms and, indeed, how they affect the 
nexus between economics and security for Asia’s two rising powers.   
References 
Aggarwal, Vinod K., and Kristi Govella (eds) (2013), Linking Trade 
and Security: Evolving Institutions and Strategies in Asia, Europe, and the 
United States, New York, NY: Springer. 
Anand, Vinod (2014), BCIM Economic Corridor: Prospects and Issues, 
Vivekananda International Foundation, 2 June, online: <www.vi 
findia.org/article/2014/june/02/bcim-economic-corridor-pros 
pects-and-issues> (4 April 2016).  
Anderson, Ashlyn, and Alyssa Ayres (2015), Economics of Influence: 
China and India in South Asia, Council on Foreign Relations, 7 
August, online: <www.cfr.org/economics/economics-influence-
china-india-south-asia/p36862> (4 April 2016). 
Anderson, David A., and Isabel Geiger (2010), Sino-Indian Trade 
Relations and the Ongoing Border Dispute, in: China and Eurasia 
Forum Quarterly, 8, 4, 125–141. 
Aneja, Atul (2015a), China, India Fast-track BCIM Corridor Project, 
in: The Hindu, 26 June. 
Aneja, Atul (2015b), Yunnan, West Bengal the Key Drivers for 
BCIM, in: The Hindu, 12 June. 
Aneja, Atul (2014a), Indian Team in China to Discuss Delhi-Chennai 
High Speed Railway Line, in: The Hindu, 25 November. 
Aneja, Atul (2014b), India Taps into Chinese Provinces for Bolstering 
Foreign Investment, in: The Hindu, 15 November. 
  62 Jingdong Yuan 

Anonymous 1 (2015), interview with Chinese India scholar, Beijing, 
15 July. 
Areddy, James T. (2015), India, China Businesses Agree on $22 Bil-
lion Worth of Deals, in: The Wall Street Journal, 16 May. 
Asia Times (2005), The Mother of All FTAs, 31 March, online: <www. 
atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GC31Df06.html> (6 June 2015). 
Barria, Carlos (2015), China’s Alibaba to Buy $550 Mln Stake in 
One97 Communications – Sources, in: Reuters, 11 January. 
Baru, Sanjaya (2012), Geo-economics and Strategy, in: Survival, 54, 3, 
47–58. 
Basu, Indrajit (2013), India Clears Way for Chinese Banks, in: China 
Daily Asia Weekly, 29 November – 5 December. 
Basu, Indrajit (2001), India Gains from Chinese WTO Accession, in: 
United Press International, 13 November. 
Basu, Nayanima (2015), In China, Modi to Push for Expediting Industrial 
Parks, 12 May, online: <www.business-standard.com/article/econ 
omy-policy/in-china-modi-to-push-for-expediting-industrial-parks- 
115051200044_1.html> (14 April 2016). 
Basu, Pratnashree (2013), From Kunming Initiative to BCIM Corridor, 31 
August, online: <www.orfonline.org/research/from-kunming-ini 
tiative-to-bcim-corridor/> (14 April 2016). 
Beeson, Mark (2015), Geopolitics versus Geoeconomics: The New Internation-
al Order, 14 March, online: <http://theconversation.com/geopol 
itics-versus-geoeconomics-the-new-international-order-38824> 
(14 April 2016).  
Bhattacharjee, Rupak (2015), BCIM-EC: Problems and Prospects, in: 
The Daily Star, 18 June. 
Cable, Vincent (1995), What Is International Economic Security?, in: 
International Affairs, 71, 2, 305–324. 
Carsten, Paul (2015), China’s Xiaomi to Invest in Indian Start-Up, in: 
Reuters, 16 January. 
Chadda, Maya (2014), Why India Matters, Boulder, CO, London, UK: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Chaturvedi, Saurabh (2014), Is China Ready to Step Up and Invest in 
India?, in: The Wall Street Journal, 17 September. 
Chaudhury, Dipanjan Roy (2015), China, India Complement Each 
Other: China Envoy Le Yucheng, in: The Economic Times, 5 
March. 
  Sino–Indian Economic Ties since 1988 63 

Chen, Li-jun, and Zi-juan Liu (旰⇑⏃⇀䳓⧇) (2013), ᆏѝঠ㔵㓿⍾
䎠ᓺᔪ䇮ሩഋഭ䍨᱃Ⲵᖡ૽ (Mengzhong yinmian jingji zoulang 
jianshe dui siguo maoyi de yingxiang, The Construction of the 
BCIM Economic Corridor and Its Impact on Trade Between 
Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar), in: ьইӊইӊ⹄ウ 
(Dongnanya Nanya Yanjiu, Southeast and South Asian Studies), 4, 38–
44. 
Cheung, Tai Ming, and Bates Gill (2013), Trade Versus Security: How 
Countries Balance Technology Transfers with China, in: Journal of 
East Asian Studies, 13, 443–456. 
China Daily USA (2015), Top 10 Trading Partners of the Chinese 
Mainland in 2014, 19 January, online: <http://usa.chinadaily. 
com.cn/business/2015-01/19/content_19350972.htm> (20 June 
2015). 
China Radio International (2015), Nathu La: New Trade Path on An-
cient Silk Road Connecting India and China, 21 August. 
Chu, Henry (2006), India and China Promise more Trade, Better 
Ties, in: Los Angeles Times, 22 November. 
CRI see China Radio International 
Deccan Herald (2015), India Raises Issue of Cheap Chinese Goods 
Flooding Domestic Market, 25 May. 
Dent, Christopher M. (2010), Economic Security, in: Alan Collins 
(ed.), Contemporary Security Studies, Oxford, UK: Oxford University 
Press, 239–255. 
Dolla, Varaprasad S. (2011), Technology Trade in India-China Rela-
tions: Divergent Dynamics and Implications, in: Journal of Interna-
tional Affairs, 64, 2, Spring. 
Embassy of India, Beijing, China (n.d.), Economic and Trade Relations, 
online: <www.indianembassy.org.cn/DynamicContent.aspx?Menu 
Id=97&SubMenuId=0> (8 June 2015). 
Engardio, Peter (ed.) (2007), Chindia: How China and India Are Revolu-
tionizing Global Business, New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. 
Fang, Tien-sze (2014), Asymmetrical Threat Perceptions in India-China 
Relations, Delhi, India: Oxford University Press. 
General Administration of Customs, People’s of Republic of China 
(n.d.), online: <http://english.customs.gov.cn/> (28 September 
2016). 
Gentleman, Amelia (2006), China and India Emphasize Cooperation, 
in: New York Times, 21 November.  
  64 Jingdong Yuan 

Global Asia (2015), Cover Story: China’s New Silk Roads: What Is 
Driving Beijing’s “Pivot to the West”, 10, 3, 7–52. 
Goldstein, Avery, and Edward D. Mansfield (eds) (2012), The Nexus of 
Economics, Security, and International Relations in East Asia, Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press. 
Grieco, Joseph (1988), Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A 
Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism, in: Inter-
national Organization, 42, 3, 485–507. 
Gupta, Anil K., and Haiyan Wang (2014), Guest Post: $100bn from 
Xi’s Visit to India? Not Likely, in: Financial Times, 15 September. 
Gupta, Anil K., and Haiyan Wang (2009), China and India: Greater 
Economic Integration, in: China Business Review, 1 September, 
online: <www.chinabusinessreview.com/china-and-india-greater- 
economic-integration/> (3 June 2015). 
Haidar, Suhasini (2015), India Grants E-visas to Chinese Nationals, 
in: The Hindu, 15 May. 
Hannam, Phillip M. (2015), China Holds Key to India’s Energy Fu-
ture, in: The Hindu, 1 June. 
Hariharan, Col R. (2015), Sparing India’s Strategic Space for China’s Entry 
in the East, South Asia Analysis Group, paper 5966, 8 July. 
Hindustan Times (2016), India Trade Deficit with China Rises to $45 
Billion Mark, 13 January. 
Huang, Yasheng (2011), The Myth of Economic Complementarity in 
Sino-Indian Relations, in: Journal of International Affairs, 64, 2, 
111–124. 
Huchet, Jean-Francois (2008), Between Geostrategic and Economic 
Competition: Emergence of a Pragmatic India-China Relation-
ship, in: China Perspectives, 3, 50–67. 
Hussain, Zaara Zain (2014), Initiative for Southern “Silk Route” Linking 
Bangladesh, China, India, and Myanmar, ISAS Working Paper, 192, 
17 June, Singapore: Institute of South Asian Studies. 
Indian Embassy in Beijing (2015), Economic and Trade Relations, online: 
<www.indianembassy.org.cn/DynamicContent.aspx?MenuId=9
7&SubMenuId=0> (8 June 2015). 
Juergens, Leonora (2014), BCIM and BIMSTEC: Two Competing Initia-
tives for Northeast India?, IPCS Article, 4454, 20 May. 
Kahler, Miles (2004), Economic Security in an Era of Globalization: 
Definition and Provision, in: Pacific Review, 17, 4, 485–502. 
  Sino–Indian Economic Ties since 1988 65 

Kannan, Shilpa (2014), India “Too Reliant” on Chinese Drug Im-
ports, Worries Delhi, in: BBC News Delhi, 5 December, online: 
<www.bbc.com/news/business-30330898> (14 April 2016). 
Karackattu, Joe Thomas (2013), India-China Economic Relations: Trends, 
Challenges and Policy Options, ICS Occasional Paper, 6, Delhi, In-
dia: Institute of Chinese Studies. 
KPMG, and IMC (2013), India Calling: India-China Investment Opportuni-
ties, New Delhi, India: KPMG. 
Krishnan, Ananth (2014), Open for Business, India Tells China, in: 
The Hindu, 30 June. 
Kurian, Nimmi (2005), Prospects for Sino-Indian Trans-border Eco-
nomic Linkages, in: International Studies, 42, 3–4, 295–306.  
Lee, Jason (2015), Chinese Smartphone Firm Xiaomi to Set Up Pro-
duction in India, in: Reuters, 12 March.  
Li, June (2014), BCIM-EC Should Be on Top of Agenda, in: The 
Daily Star, 20 March. 
Li, Tianhua (ᵾཙॾ) (2004), ѝഭоঠᓖ㓿䍨ޣ㌫ਁኅ࠶᷀ (Zhong-
guo yu Yindu jingmao guanxi fazhan fenxi, Developments in Si-
no–Indian Trade and Economic Ties), in: ഭ䱵䍨᱃䰞仈 (Guoji 
Maoyi Wenti, International Trade), 1, 49–54. 
Livemint (2015), What Is Behind the Widening India-China Trade 
Gap?, 15 May, online: <www.livemint.com/Politics/nMVyEE2 
0GtPHjII2JhZlUM/What-is-behind-the-IndiaChina-trade-gap. 
html> (14 April 2016). 
Mahajan, Neelima (2014), Better Days for Business between India 
and China?, in: CKGSB Knowledge, 20 October, online: <http:// 
knowledge.ckgsb.edu.cn/2014/10/20/finance-and-investment/ 
better-days-for-business-between-india-and-china/> (1 July 2015). 
Maini, Tridivesh Singh (2015), Provincial Exchanges Build Economic 
and Personal Sino-Indian Ties, in: Global Times, 25 February. 
Mallet, Victor (2005), Fuel for Rivalry: Asia’s Thirst for Energy 
Brings Fresh Alliances But Also Tensions, in: Financial Times, 25 
February. 
Mallet, Victor, and Lucy Hornby (2015), India and China Sign $22bn 
in Deals During Modi Visit, in: Financial Times, 17 May. 
Mansfield, Edward D., and Brian M. Pollins (eds) (2003), Interdepend-
ence and International Conflicts: New Perspectives on an Enduring Debate, 
Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press. 
  66 Jingdong Yuan 

Martin, Peter (2015), Beyond 1962: How to Upgrade the Sino-Indian 
Relationship, Snapshot, in: Foreign Affairs, 15 April. 
Martin, Peter (2014), Why Is Chinese Investment in India So Low?, 
in: Observer Research Foundation, 30 October. 
Mastanduno, Michael (1998), Economics and Security in Statecrafte 
and Scholarship, in: International Organization, 4, 825–854. 
McLaughlin, Kathleen (2014), How Do You Say Taj Mahal in Chi-
nese? India Seeks Tourists, in: Christian Science Monitor, 7 June. 
Miglani, Sanjeev (2015), Indian Rail Projects Outweigh Rivalry before 
Modi Visit to China, in: Reuters, 11 May. 
Ministry of Commerce, People’s Republic of China (n.d.), Country 
Trade Report: India, online: <http://english.mofcom.gov.cn> (27 
September 2016). 
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India (2015), List of 
Agreements Signed during the Visit of Prime Minister to China, 15 May. 
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India (2013), Joint State-
ment on the State Visit of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang to India, 20 May. 
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India (2003), Declaration 
on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation Between the 
Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China, 23 June. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2003), Declaration on Principles for Relations 
and Comprehensive Cooperation Between the People’s Republic of China 
and the Republic of India, signed on 26 June, online: <www.fmprc. 
gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/t22852.htm> (6 June 2016).
Mishra, Asit Ranjan (2012), India, China to Address Trade Concerns, 
in: Livemint, 27 August. 
Mohanty, S. K. (2014), India-China Bilateral Trade Relationship, study 
prepared for Reserve Bank of India, July, online: <www.ris.org. 
in/sites/default/files/pdf/India%20china%20report.pdf> (14 
April 2016).  
Mozur, Paul, and Saritha Rai (2015), Chinese Smartphone Makers Try 
to Make Inroads in India, in: New York Times, 12 May. 
Nair, Rupam Jain (2014), Xi Sees Factory China and Back Office 
India as Global Engine, in: Reuters, 17 September. 
Nataraj, Geethanjali (2015), India Should Get on Board China’s Mari-
time Silk Road, in: East Asia Forum, 27 June. 
Nataraj, Geethanjali, and Richa Sekhani (2014), Border Issues Gnaw 
at Stronger India-China Trade Ties, in: East Asia Forum, 3 Octo-
ber. 
  Sino–Indian Economic Ties since 1988 67 

Narayanan, Raviprasad (2003), India’s Foreign Policy Towards China: 
The NDA Experience, in: Harvard Asia Quarterly, 7, 4, 29–34. 
Ollapally, Deepa M. (2014), China and India: Economic Ties and 
Strategic Rivalry, in: Orbis, 58, 3, 342–357. 
Ostry, Sylvia, and Richard R. Nelson (1995), Techno-nationalism and 
Techno-globalism: Conflict and Cooperation, Washington, DC: The 
Brookings Institution. 
Palit, Amitendu (2014), Paranoid about the Deficit, in: The Indian 
Express, 23 September. 
Panda, Jagannath (2014), India-China Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED): 
Progress and Prognosis, IDSA Issue Brief, 3 April. 
Pandey, Piyush (2014), China to Invest $100 Billion over Five Years, 
in: The Times of India, 13 September. 
Pempel, T. J. (ed.) (2013), The Economy-Security Nexus in Northeast Asia, 
London, UK, New York, NY: Routledge. 
Pew Research Center (2014), Global Opposition to U.S. Surveillance and 
Drones, but Limited Harm to America’s Image, 14 July, online: 
<www.pewglobal.org/files/2014/07/2014-07-14-Balance-of-
Power.pdf> (17 July 2014). 
Press Trust of India (2015), India-China Trade Has Potential Worth US 
$80 Billion in 2015: Industry Lobby, 1 October. 
Rahman, Mustafizur (2014), BCIM-EC: An Emerging Opportunity, Dha-
ka, Bangladesh: Centre for Policy Dialogue. 
Rana, Kishan S. (2015), India and China – A Grand Design, in: Busi-
ness Standard, 23 May. 
Rapkin, David P., and William R. Thompson (2006), Will Economic 
Interdependence Encourage China’s and India’s Peaceful Rise?, 
in: Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills (eds), Strategic Asia 2006–
2007: Trade, Interdependence, and Security, Seattle, WA, Washington, 
DC: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 333–363. 
Ravenhill, John (2013), Economic and Security in the Asia-Pacific 
Region, in: The Pacific Review, 26, 1, 1–15. 
Ren, Jia (ԫ֣) (2003), ѝঠ㔵ᆏൠ४㓿⍾ਸ֌Ⲵᡈ⮕᜿ѹ (Zhongyin 
mianmeng diqu jingji hezuo de zhanlue yiyi, The Strategic Signif-
icance of China–India–Myanmar–Bangladesh Regional Econom-
ic Cooperation, in: ইӊ⹄ウ (Nanya Yanjiu, South Asian Studies), 
74, 17–22. 
Reuters (2015a), Bharti Airtel, China Mobile to Collaborate on 4G, 3 
March.  
  68 Jingdong Yuan 

Reuters (2015b), China’s Huawei Makes $170 Million “Make in India” 
Investment, 5 February. 
Reuters (2015c), India to Raise Import Tax on Steel to Counter China 
Threat, 28 February. 
Reuters (2014), India Calls for More Chinese Investment, 30 June.  
Roy, Ambar Singh (2006), Nathula Pass Reopened after 44 Years, in: 
The Hindu, 6 July. 
Roy, Rajesh (2015), India Said to Pick Japan for High-Speed Rail 
Project, in: The Wall Street Journal, 10 December. 
Sahoo, Pravaka, and Abhirup Bhunia (2014), BCIM a Game Changer 
for South Asian Trade, in: East Asia Forum, 18 July. 
Sen, Amiti (2015), Modi Expected to Push China to Narrow Trade 
Deficit with India, in: The Hindu, 24 April. 
Sharma, Aman (2015), Make in India: Chinese Telecom Giant 
Huawei to Set Up a Unit in Tamil Nadu, in: India Times, 14 July. 
Sharma, Anuradha (2014), Modi, Xi Put India-China Economic Ties 
Ahead of Border Tensions, in: World Politics Review, 19 Septem-
ber. 
Sharma, Rajesh (2014), China-India FTA: Is the Future Imperfect?, 
in: Journal of World Trade, 48, 4, 729–749. 
Sharma, Aparna, and Chetna K. Rathore (2015), BIMSTEC and BCIM 
Initiatives and Their Importance for India, Discussion Paper, CUTS 
International, November. 
Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh, and Jingdong Yuan (2001), China and 
India: Building Confidence Through Cooperative Monitoring, in: 
Asian Survey, 41, 2, 351–376.  
Singh, Bhartendu Kumar (2011), Sino-Indian Economic Strategic Dialogue: 
Beyond the Beijing Round, IPCS Issue Brief, 177. 
Singhal, Rajrishi (2015), India-China Deficit: Beyond Iron Ore, Gateway 
House, 6 June. 
Srivastava, Shruti (2015), India Turning to Services to Bridge Widen-
ing Trade Deficit with China, in: The Indian Express, 22 May. 
Srivastava, Shruti (2012), China, India to Fix Failing Trade, in: The 
Indian Express, 25 August. 
Subba, Bhim B. (2013), India, China and the Nathu La: Realizing the 
Potential of a Border Trade, Issue Brief, 205, Delhi, India: Institute 
of Peace and Conflict Studies. 
Swanson, Ana (2014a), India-China Relations: Silk Road 2.0. CKGSB 
Knowledge, 22 September, online: <http://knowledge.ckgsb.edu. 
  Sino–Indian Economic Ties since 1988 69 

cn/2014/09/22/finance-and-investment/india-china-relations-
silk-road-2-0/> (30 June 2015). 
Swanson, Ana (2014b), Five Reasons India Shouldn’t Worry About 
Its Trade Deficit with China, in: Forbes, 28 September. 
Tellis, Ashley J. (2006), Trade, Interdependence, and Security in Asia, 
in: Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills (eds), Strategic Asia 2006-07: 
Trade, Interdependence, and Security, Seattle, WA, Washington, DC: 
The National Bureau of Asian Research, 3–25. 
Tellis, Ashley J., Alison Szalwinski, and Michael Wills (eds) (2016), 
Strategic Asia 2015-16: Foundations of National Power in the Asia-
Pacific, Seattle, WA, Washington, DC: The National Bureau of 
Asian Research. 
Tellis, Ashley J., Travis Tanner, and Jessica Keough (eds) (2011), 
Strategic Asia 2011-12: Asia Responds to Its Rising Powers: China and 
India, Seattle, WA, Washington, DC: The National Bureau of 
Asian Research. 
The Economic Times (2015a), Number of Indian Students in China 
Crosses 13,500, 25 May. 
The Economic Times (2015b), Bank of China May Open First India 
Branch in Mumbai, 25 May.  
The Economic Times (2015c), India’s Trade Deficit with China Rose to 
$37.8 Billion in 2014, 13 January. 
The Economic Times (2014a), India Should Have Free Trade Agreement 
with China: FIEO, 21 August. 
The Economic Times (2014b), Indo-China Trade Ministers Meet: Market 
Access, Trade Deficit Key Issues, 17 August.  
The Economic Times (2014c), India, China Likely to Sign MOU for 
Cooperation in Railways, 20 July. 
The Economic Times (2012), India–China Trade Hits All-Time High of 
$73.9 bn in 2011, 30 January. 
The Economic Times (2010), China Avoids Condemning India over 
Huawei, ZTE Ban, 17 May. 
The Economist (2014), India and China: Strangers by Choice, 19 Au-
gust. 
The Times of India (2015a), Hardly Any Foreign Investment into India, 
Chinese Mouthpiece Says, 18 May. 
The Times of India (2015b), Tata Communications Ties Up with China 
Telecom Global, 11 May.  
  70 Jingdong Yuan 

The Times of India (2014), Chinese FDI into India Could Touch $30 
Billion by 2025, 14 July. 
TJSIAD (2012), Indian Investment in China, March. 
Uberoi, Patricia (2014), BICM Economic Corridor: A Leap into the Un-
known?, Working Paper, Delhi, India: Institute of Chinese Stud-
ies. 
Uberoi, Patricia (2013), The BCIM Forum: Retrospect and Prospect, Work-
ing Paper, Delhi, India: Institute of Chinese Studies. 
Upadhyay, Anindya (2015), China’s Cheap Solar Panels Cause Dark 
Spots in Indian Market, in: The Economic Times, 3 January. 
Vaid, Manish, and Tridivesh Singh Maini (2015), BCIM: Can India Be 
a Driving Force?, in: The Diplomat, 1 January. 
Vandenbussche, Hylke, and Christian Viegelahn (2012), Indian Anti-
dumping Measures against China: Evidence from Monthly Trade Data, 
Discussion Paper, 2012-25, online: <http://sites.uclouvain.be/ 
econ/DP/IRES/2012025.pdf> (7 July 2015). 
Venu, M. K. (2015), Investment the Way to Reduce India-China 
Trust Deficit, in: The Wire, 16 May. 
Wang, Hongwei (⦻ᆿ㓜) (2009), ᖃԓѝঠޣ㌫䇴䘠 (Dangdai Zhong 
Yin guanxi pingshu, Contemporary Sino-Indian Relations), Beijing: ѝഭ
㯿ᆖࠪ⡸⽮  (Zhongguo zangxue chubanshe, China Tibetan 
Studies Press). 
Xinhua (2016), China-India Ties to Benefit World: Envoy, 5 January. 
Yang, Siling (ᶘᙍ⚥) (2013), ѝঠᡈ⮕ਸ֌Չդޣ㌫⹄ウ (Zhong Yin 
zhanlüe hezuo huoban guanxi yanjiu, Sino-Indian Strategic Partnership), 
Beijing: ѝഭ⽮Պ、ᆖࠪ⡸⽮ (Zhongguo shehui kexue chuban-
she, Chinese Social Sciences Press). 
Yu, Zhen, Minghui Shen, and Qiong Wang (։ᥟ⊸䬝䖹⦻⩬) 
(2014), 䇪ѝഭˉঠᓖ FTAⲴ䍨᱃ส⹰о㓿⍾᭸ᓄ (Lun Zhong-
guo–Yindu FTA de maoyi jichu yu jingji xiaoying, An Analysis of 
the Commercial Foundation for and the Economic Impact of a 
China-India FTA), in: ইӊ⹄ウ (Nanya Yanjiu, South Asian Stud-
ies), 4, 12–27. 
Zhang, Yuyan, and Jingchun Zhang (ᕐᆷ⠅ᕐ䶉᱕)(2006), ӊ⍢㓿
⍾аփॆлⲴѝঠޣ㌫ (Yazhou jingji yitihua xia de Zhong Yin 
guanxi, Sino-Indian Relations under Asian Integration), in: ᖃԓ
ӊཚ (Dangdai Yatai, Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies), 2, 3–17. 
Zhang, Yuyan, Jianglin Zhao, Xiaoxue Liu, and Xiaomin Wang (ᕐᆷ
⠅䎥⊏᷇ࡈሿ䴚⦻ሿ᭿) (2015), ᯠᰦᵏѝঠ㓿䍨ޣ㌫ਁኅⲴ
  Sino–Indian Economic Ties since 1988 71 

ᡈ⮕ᙍ㘳 (Xinshiqi Zhong Yin jingmao guanxi fazhan de zhan-
lüe sikao, Strategic Considerations of the Sino-Indian Economic 
and Trade Ties in the New Era), in: ᖃԓӊཚ (Dangdai Yatai, 
Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies), 8, 12–20. 
Zhong, Raymond, and Anant Vijay Kala (2015), India Growth Rate 
Set to Rival China, in: Wall Street Journal, 9 February. 
Zhu, Cuiping (ᵡ㘐㨽) (2014), ঠᓖ⌻оѝഭ (Yinduyang yu Zhongguo, 
The Indian Ocean and China), Beijing: ⽮Պ、ᆖ᮷⥞ࠪ⡸⽮ (Shehui 
kexue wenxian chubanshe, Social Sciences Academic Press). 
  Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 3/2016:  1–2 
Contents
Non-Traditional Security in Sino–Indian Relations 
Introduction 
       Sebastian BIBA 
New Concerns, More Cooperation? How Non-
Traditional Security Issues Affect Sino–Indian 
Relations 3
Research Articles 
      Jingdong YUAN 
Sino–Indian Economic Ties since 1988: Progress, 
Problems, and Prospects for Future Development 31
      Andrew F. COOPER and Asif B. FAROOQ 
The Role of China and India in the G20 and BRICS: 
Commonalities or Competitive Behaviour? 73
       Olivia GIPPNER 
Antipiracy and Unusual Coalitions in the Indian Ocean 
Region: China’s Changing Role and Confidence  
Building with India 107
       David SCOTT 
Buddhism in Current China–India Diplomacy 139
Research Articles 
      Laura DOMBERNOWSKY 
Training Responsible Journalists in China: Guiding 
Domestic Opinion, Gaining Foreign Audiences 175
      Huisheng SHOU and Gary S. GREEN 
The Political Economy of Organisational Violence in 
Chinese Industry 201
  2 Contents 
Contributors 231
Article Index 2016 233
 
